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Abstract. Threshold cryptography increases security and resilience by
sharing a private cryptographic key over different devices. Many personal
devices, however, are not suited for threshold schemes, because they do
not offer secure storage, which is needed to store shares of the private
key. We present a solution that allows to include devices without them
having to store their share. Shares are stored in protected form, possibly
externally, which makes our solution suitable for low-cost devices with a
factory-embedded key, e.g., car keys and access cards. By using pairings
we achieve public verifiability in a wide range of protocols, which removes
the need for private channels. We demonstrate how to modify existing
discrete-log based threshold schemes to work in this setting. Our core
result is a new publicly verifiable distributed key generation protocol
that is provably secure against static adversaries and does not require all
devices to be present.
1 Introduction
The increased capabilities of mobile devices and connectivity with the rest of the
world have made the use of these devices exceed their original purpose. Mobile
phones are being used to read e-mail, authorise bank transactions or access social
network sites. As a consequence, personal devices are used more and more for
security-sensitive tasks. Moreover, personal data are copied to these devices and
need to be protected. In both cases, by using cryptography, security reduces
to the management of cryptographic keys. Although mobility is considered as a
major benefit, it is a weakness in terms of security and reliability. Mobile devices
are susceptible to theft, can easily be forgotten or lost, or run out of battery
power. These issues can be mitigated by introducing threshold cryptography.
The aim of threshold cryptography is to protect a key by sharing it amongst
a number of entities in such a way that only a subset of minimal size, namely
the threshold t + 1, can use the key. No information about the key can be
learnt from t or less shares. The setup of a threshold scheme typically involves
a Distributed Key Generation (DKG) protocol. In a DKG protocol a group of
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entities cooperate to jointly generate a key pair and obtain shares of the private
key. These shares can then be used to sign or decrypt on behalf of the group.
The benefits of a threshold scheme are increased security, because an adver-
sary can compromise up to t devices, and resilience, since any subset of t + 1
devices is sufficient. To increase resilience we want to maximise the number of
devices included in the threshold scheme. However, the number of personal de-
vices suitable for threshold schemes is limited because many of these do not
incorporate secure storage, which is needed to store shares of the private key.
We enlarge the group of high-end devices by also considering small devices with
public-key functionality, e.g., car keys or access cards. Typically, these small de-
vices have a factory-embedded private key, which cannot be updated and is the
only object that resides in tamper-proof secure storage.
Our proposed solution allows to store shares in protected form,1 possibly
externally. These protected shares are generated through a run of our new DKG
protocol. By using pairings we achieve publicly verifiability, which implies that
the correctness of any device’s contribution can be verified by any entity ob-
serving the DKG protocol thus eliminating private channels. As such, not every
device needs to be present during the DKG protocol. We apply our setting to ex-
isting threshold schemes and we show how shares can be used implicitly without
being needed in unprotected form. Furthermore, some devices can be completely
ignorant of the underlying schemes and only serve as partial decryption oracles.
Organisation. Related work is surveyed in Sect. 2. In Sect. 3 we introduce some
basic concepts. We give an overview of typical routines in a threshold setting
and we describe our communication and adversarial model. Security definitions
are given along with an overview of relevant number-theoretic assumptions and
notation on bilinear pairings. In Sect. 4 we present how to protect shares and our
main result, which is a new publicly verifiable DKG protocol that does not re-
quire every device to be present. In Sect. 5 we demonstrate how protected shares
can easily be used in discrete-log based cryptosystems and signature schemes.
More specifically, we demonstrate this for the ElGamal [14] and the Cramer-
Shoup [7] cryptosystems, and the Schnorr signature scheme [25].
2 Related Work
Shamir’s early idea [27] of distributing shares of a secret as evaluations of a poly-
nomial has become a standard building block in threshold cryptography. Feld-
man [8] introduced verifiable secret sharing (VSS) by publishing the coefficients
of this polynomial hidden in the exponent of the generator of a group in which
the discrete-log assumption holds. Pedersen [22] then used this idea to construct
the first distributed key generation (DKG) protocol, sometimes referred to as
Joint Feldman, by having each player in a group run an instance of Feldman’s
1 An obvious answer would be to encrypt shares under the devices’ public keys. This is
undesired because at some point shares will be in the clear in unprotected memory.
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protocol in parallel. Soon thereafter, Pedersen [23] produced another remark-
able result. He made Feldman’s VSS scheme information-theoretically secure
by choosing two polynomials and broadcasting the corresponding coefficients as
paired commitments, which are known as Pedersen commitments. Gennaro et
al. [15] pointed out that the uniformity of the key produced by Pedersen’s DKG
protocol cannot be guaranteed in the context of a rushing adversary. They con-
structed a new DKG protocol [15] by first running Pedersen’s VSS in parallel
(Joint Pedersen). Since Pedersen VSS does not produce a public key, an extra
round of communication, basically an instance of Joint Feldman on the first poly-
nomial, has to be added to compute the public key. They proved their protocol
secure against a static adversary by means of a simulation argument. Interest-
ingly, Gennaro et al. showed later [16] that, despite the biased distribution of
the key, certain discrete-log schemes that use Pedersen DKG can still be proved
secure at the cost of an increased security parameter. Canetti et al. [6] used
interactive knowledge proofs and erasures, i.e., players erase private data be-
fore commitments or public values are broadcast, in the key construction phase
of the DKG of [15] to make the protocol secure against adaptive adversaries.
Comparable adaptively secure threshold schemes were presented by Frankel et
al. [10].
In the protocols discussed so far, it is assumed that there are private channels
between each pair of players. Both [6] and [10] suggest that these channels can
still be established even with an adaptive adversary using the non-committing
encryption technique of Beaver and Haber [3], which assumes erasures. Jarecki
and Lysyanskaya [19] criticised this erasure model and pointed out that the pro-
tocols presented in [6] and [10] are not secure in the concurrent setting, i.e., two
instances of the same scheme can not be run at the same time. They solved
this by introducing a “committed proof”, i.e., a zero-knowledge proof where the
statement that is being proved is not revealed until the end of the proof. To im-
plement the secure channels without erasures they use an encryption scheme that
is non-committing to the receiver. Abe and Fehr [1] later proposed an adaptively-
secure (Feldman-based) DKG and applications with complete security proofs in
the Universal Composability framework of Canetti [5]. They demonstrated that
a discrete-log DKG protocol can be achieved without interactive zero-knowledge
proofs. However, they still need a single inconsistent player and a secure mes-
sage transmission functionality (private channels), which can be realised using a
receiver non-committing transmission protocol based on [19].
As a consequence of private channels, each of the aforementioned DKG pro-
tocols has some kind of complaint procedure or dispute resolution mechanism.
To get rid of these, several authors have proposed protocols that provide public
verifiability. Stadler [29] was of the first to propose a publicly verifiable secret
sharing (PVSS) protocol. In addition to the Feldman commitments, shares were
broadcast in encrypted form and verified using a non-interactive proof of equality
of (double) discrete logarithms. A more efficient protocol was presented by Fu-
jisaki and Okamoto [11], which is secure under a modified RSA assumption. The
first PVSS shown secure under the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption
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was given by Schoenmakers [26]. The shares are broadcast in encrypted form by
hiding them in the exponent of each player’s individual public key, which has a
different base (another generator) than the Feldman commitments. The dealer
then uses non-interactive proofs of discrete-log equality. Furthermore, correct
behaviour of the players is verified by extending the secret reconstruction phase
with additional proofs of correctness. Based on Schoenmakers’ result Heidarvand
and Villar [18] presented the first PVSS protocol where verifiability is obtained
from bilinear pairings over elliptic curves and no proofs are needed. Unfortu-
nately, the scheme cannot be used to set up a DKG because the shared secret is
in the co-domain of the pairing. The first full DKG that does not require private
channels was given by Fouque and Stern [9]. The buildings blocks for their con-
struction are Paillier’s cryptosystem and a new non-interactive zero-knowledge
proof. To deal with rushing adversar it is simply assumed that communication
is completely synchronous. For participants not present during the DKG the
amount of information that needs to be stored, i.e., the subshares that need to
be decrypted, is linear in the number of participants that are active in the DKG.
3 Basic Concepts
Before we describe our new protocols, we give an overview of basic concepts that
will be used later on.
3.1 Threshold Cryptography
Threshold cryptography typically involves routines related to setting up the
group, encryption and signatures. A private key is shared amongst n devices
and only a subset of at least t+1 devices need to employ their shares to (implic-
itly) use this private key in a cryptosystem or signature scheme. We define the
following set of routines (threshold routines are indicated with the prefix T):
Pre-setup.
– Init: Initialise the system parameters.
– KeyGen: Generate key material for a device.
Setup.
– ConstructGroup: Given a set of n devices and their public keys, create
and share a key pair for the group with a subset of the devices.
Signatures.
– T-Sign: At least t + 1 devices collaborate to generate a signature on a
message that is verifiable under the group’s public key.
– Verify: Using the group’s public key a signature is verified.
Encryption.
– Encrypt: Encrypt a message under the group’s public key.
– T-Decrypt: At least t+1 devices collaborate to decrypt a given ciphertext
that was encrypted under the group’s public key.
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3.2 Communication and Adversarial Model
We assume that n devices {Di}i=1..n, of which t can be faulty, communicate
over a dedicated broadcast channel.2 By dedicated we mean that if a device Di
broadcasts a message, then it is received by all other devices and recognised as
coming from this device. There are no private channels, all communication goes
over the broadcast channel. Communication is round-synchronous, protocols run
in rounds and there is a time bound on each round.
A distinction is commonly made between static and adaptive adversaries.
Static means that the adversary corrupts the devices before the protocol starts,
whereas adaptive means that a device can become corrupt before or at any time
during execution of a protocol. We assume a malicious computationally bounded
static adversary who can corrupt up to t devices. The adversary has access
to all information stored by the corrupted devices and can manipulate their
behaviour during the execution of a protocol in any way. The round-synchronous
communication implies that the adversary could be rushing, i.e., he can wait in
each round to send messages on behalf of the corrupted devices until he has
received the messages from all uncorrupted devices.
3.3 Security Definitions
In a secret sharing scheme a dealer splits a secret into pieces, called shares,
and distributes them amongst several parties. In a threshold setting, the secret
can be reconstructed from any subset of shares of a minimum size. An early
solution was given by Shamir [27], who shared a secret x by choosing a random
polynomial f of degree t such that x = f(0) and each share is an evaluation
of this polynomial, i.e., xi = f(i). Any point on a polynomial of degree t can
be reconstructed by Lagrange interpolation through at least t+ 1 points of this
polynomial. To reconstruct the secret x, the shares are combined as x =
∑
λixi,
with λi the appropriate Lagrange multipliers.
Verifiable secret sharing (VSS) allows the receivers to verify that the dealer
properly shared a secret. We briefly rephrase the requirements of a secure VSS
([23] and [15, Lemma 1]).
Definition 1 (Secure VSS). A VSS protocol is secure if it satisfies the follow-
ing conditions:
1. Correctness. If the dealer is not disqualified then any subset of t + 1 honest
players can recover the unique secret.
2. Verifiability. Incorrect shares can be detected at reconstruction time by using
the output of the protocol.
3. Secrecy. The view of a computationally bounded static adversary A is inde-
pendent of the secret, or, the protocol is semantically secure against A.
The drawback of VSS is that a single party knows the secret. This can be
solved by generating and sharing the key in a distributed way. The correctness
and secrecy requirements for DKG were defined by Gennaro et al. [17].
2 We abstract from the actual implementation of the dedicated broadcast channel.
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Definition 2 (Secure DKG). A DKG protocol is secure if it satisfies the fol-
lowing conditions:
Correctness is guaranteed if:
(C1) All subsets of t+1 shares provided by honest players define the same private
key.
(C2) All honest parties know the same public key corresponding to the unique
private key as defined by (C1).
(C3) The private key (and thus also the public key) is uniformly distributed.
Secrecy is guaranteed if an adversary can learn no information about the pri-
vate key beyond what can be learnt from the public key. This requirement can be
further enhanced with a simulation argument: for any adversary there should be
a simulator that, given a public key, simulates a run of the protocol for which the
output is indistinguishable of the adversary’s view of a real run of the protocol
that ended with the given public key.
3.4 Pairings and Number-Theoretic Assumptions
We review some assumptions that are relevant for this paper and we refer the
reader to [21] and [28] for more details.
Pairing Notation. Let G1, G2 and GT be cyclic groups of order ` and let eˆ be a
non-degenerate bilinear pairing
eˆ : G1 ×G2 → GT .
A pairing is non-degenerate if for each element P in G1 there is a Q in G2 such
that eˆ(P,Q) 6= 1 and vice versa for each element Q in G2. A pairing is bilinear
if eˆ(P + P ′, Q) = eˆ(P,Q)eˆ(P ′, Q), thus eˆ(aP,Q) = eˆ(P,Q)a with a ∈ Z`, and
vice versa for elements in G2. We will use multiplicative notation for GT and
additive notation for G1 and G2.
Discrete Logarithm. Let P be a generator of G1 and let Y be a given arbitrary
element of G1. The discrete logarithm (DL) problem in G1 is to find the unique
integer a ∈ Z` such that Y = aP . Similarly, the problem can be defined in G2
and GT . The DL assumption states that it is computationally hard to solve the
DL problem.
Diffie-Hellman. Let P be a generator of G1 and let aP, bP be two given arbitrary
elements of G1, with a, b ∈ Z`. The computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) prob-
lem in G1 is to find abP . The tuple 〈P, aP, bP, abP 〉 is called a Diffie-Hellman
tuple. Given a third element cP ∈ G1, the decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH)
problem is to determine if 〈P, aP, bP, cP 〉 is a valid Diffie-Hellman tuple or not.
Obviously, if one can solve the DL problem then one can also solve the CDH prob-
lem. The opposite does not necessarily hold and, therefore, the CDH assumption
is said to be a stronger assumption than the DL assumption. A divisional variant
of the DDH problem [2], which is considered to be equivalent, is to determine if
〈P, aP, cP, abP 〉 is a valid DH tuple or not, i.e., if c = b.
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Co-Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (coBDH). For asymmetric pairings, i.e., G1 6= G2,
where there is no known efficiently computable isomorphism ψ : G2 → G1 the
following problem can be defined. The coBDH-2 problem is defined as given
P ∈ G1 and Q, aQ, bQ ∈ G2, find eˆ(P,Q)
ab. We denote the decisional variant
as coDBDH-2. A divisional variant of the coDBDH-2 problem is to determine
whether 〈P,Q, aQ, abQ, gc〉 is a valid coBDH-2 tuple.
Inversion Problems. Galbraith et al. [12] studied several inversion problems for
pairings. They concluded that these problems are hard enough to rely upon. The
most intuitive argument is that if one can solve a particular pairing inversion in
polynomial time then one can also solve a related Diffie-Hellman problem in one
of the domains or the co-domain.
3.5 Pre-setup
The pre-setup phase is straightforward and works as follows.
Init(1k): The input is a security parameter k. Let G1, G2 and GT be finite
cyclic groups of prime order ` with P , Q and g = eˆ(P,Q) generators of the
respective groups. It is assumed that there is no known efficiently computable
isomorphism ψ : G2 → G1. Let P
′ and P ′′ be two other generators of G1 for
which the discrete logarithm relative to the base P is unknown and let g1 = g,
g2 = eˆ(P
′, Q) and g3 = eˆ(P
′′, Q). The procedure outputs the description of the
groups (G1,G2,GT ) and the pairing (eˆ) along with the public system parameters
PubPar = (P, P ′, P ′′, Q) ∈ G3
1
×G2 .
KeyGen(PubPar,Di): For the given device Di a random si ∈R Z
∗
` is chosen as
private key. The corresponding public key is Si = siQ. The procedure outputs
Di’s key pair
(si, Si) ∈ Z
∗
` ×G2 .
Note that this procedure is executed only once in the lifetime of each Di and
that si is the only secret that has to be securely stored. Typically, this routine is
executed during fabrication of the device. A public key can easily be computed
for a different set of system parameters if this would be required.
4 Distributed Key Generation
In this section, we present our main result, which is a new distributed key gen-
eration (DKG) protocol. Recall from the introduction that we want to set up a
threshold construction without the devices having to securely store their share.
Instead, the shares will be stored in protected form. This idea is put forward in
Sect. 4.1. Our DKG consists of two phases. First, a private key is jointly gener-
ated and shared through the parallel execution of a new publicly verifiable secret
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sharing (PVSS) protocol. This PVSS protocol is described in Sect. 4.2. Second,
the corresponding public key is extracted. Together, these two phases make up
our new DKG protocol, which is presented in Sect. 4.3.
4.1 Protecting Shares
As mentioned in Sect. 3.5, each device Di is initialised with its own key pair
(si, Si). If the group’s private key was x ∈ Z`, then the device would receive a
share xi ∈ Z` that has to be securely stored. Since the device does not provide
secure storage it has to store its share in protected form. One option is to en-
crypt the share xi. This has the disadvantages of involving a costly decryption
operation and the fact that the share will at some point reside in the clear in the
device’s memory. Another option is to store the share as the product xisi. The
obvious disadvantage is that t + 1 devices can collaborate to compute another
device’s private key si.
As we do not want a device’s private key si ever to be revealed, we combine
shares with the device’s public key and store these as public correction factors
Ci = xiSi ∈ G2. A similar idea was used in [26]. However, here we use bilinear
pairings to achieve public verifiability and easy integration of our scheme in
existing discrete-log cryptosystems and signature schemes, without ever having
to reveal the shares (see Sect. 5). We define the group’s private key as xQ ∈ G2
and y = gx = eˆ(P, xQ) ∈ GT as its public key.
3 As such, the share of a device is
xiQ = s
−1
i Ci ∈ G2. The construct group routine is formally defined as follows.
– ConstructGroup(PubPar,{Di, Si},t): A subset of the devices Di generates
the group’s public key gx and shares the private key xQ in the form of public
correction factors Ci = xiSi for all n devices. The procedure outputs the
group’s public key
y = gx = eˆ(P, xQ) ∈ GT
and the public correction factors which are added to the public parameters
PubPar = (P, P ′, P ′′, Q, y, {Ci}i=1,...,n) ∈ G
3
1
×G2 ×GT ×G
n
2
.
4.2 Publicly Verifiable Secret Sharing
The main building block to construct our DKG protocol is a new PVSS protocol.
In this protocol, a dealer generates shares of a secret and distributes them in
protected form. Any party observing the output of the protocol can verify that
the dealer behaved correctly. Basically, the protocol goes as follows.
The dealer chooses uniformly at random x ∈R Z`. The actual secret that is
shared at the end of the protocol is xQ. Similar to Pedersen’s VSS scheme [23],
the dealer chooses two random polynomials f and f ′ of degree t, sets the constant
3 We note that we could use notation X and Xi for the private key and its shares.
However, to compute the correction factor Ci, elements of Z` will be combined with
Si, but by definition, private key material is in G2.
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term of polynomial f to x and broadcasts pairwise commitments Ak ∈ G1 to the
coefficients of the polynomials. Evaluations of both polynomials are combined
with the public keys of the devices and broadcast in protected form. Each device
verifies that all broadcast shares are correct by applying the pairing to check
them against the commitments. The details of the protocol are given in Fig. 1.
The dealer shares the secret xQ, for which he chooses x ∈R Z` :
1. The dealer constructs two polynomials f(z) and f ′(z) of degree t by choosing
random coefficients ck, c
′
k ∈R Z
∗
` for k = 0 . . . t , except for c0, which is c0 = x :
f(z) = c0 + c1z + . . .+ ctz
t
, f
′(z) = c′0 + c
′
1z + . . .+ c
′
tz
t
.
The dealer broadcasts commitments
Ak = ckP + c
′
kP
′
, k = 0 . . . t .
2. For each device Di, the dealer computes and broadcasts
xiSi , x
′
iSi with xi = f(i) , x
′
i = f
′(i) , i = 1 . . . n .
3. Each device verifies the broadcast shares for all Di by checking that
eˆ(P, xiSi) · eˆ(P
′
, x
′
iSi) =
t∏
k=0
eˆ(Ak, Si)
ik
. (1)
If any of these checks fails, the dealer is disqualified.
Fig. 1. Publicly verifiable secret sharing.
Private channels are avoided because the shares xiQ are broadcast in pro-
tected form xiSi. Each device could recover its share by using its private key.
However, the shares are never needed in unprotected form. The protected form
allows for public verifiability, since for any device Di the correctness of xiSi and
x′iSi can be verified by pairing the commitments with Di’s public key Si. The
dealer is disqualified, if for any Di this verification fails. As a consequence, there
is no need for a cumbersome complaint procedure. Moreover, not all devices
need to be present during the execution of the protocol because the shares were
already broadcast in the form in which they will be stored and used.
In the next theorem we will demonstrate that our new PVSS protocol satisfies
the requirements of secure VSS protocol as given by Definition 1.
Theorem 1. Our new PVSS protocol is a secure VSS protocol (Definition 1)
under the divisional variant of the DDH assumption in G2.
Proof (Correctness). It follows directly from Pedersen’s result [23] that each sub-
set of t+ 1 devices can reconstruct the coefficients ckQ, c
′
kQ of the polynomials
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F (z) = f(z)Q and F ′(z) = f ′(z)Q from their shares. If the dealer is not disqual-
ified then (1) holds for all devices and the coefficients will successfully be verified
against the commitments Ak. Hence, it can be verified that all shares are on the
same (respective) polynomial and each subset of t+ 1 devices can compute the
same secret xQ = F (0) . uunionsq
Proof (Verifiability). During reconstruction Di provides xiQ and x
′
iQ, and it can
be verified that eˆ(P, xiQ) · eˆ(P
′, x′iQ) =
∏t
k=0 eˆ(Ak, Q)
ik . uunionsq
Proof (Secrecy). Consider a worst-case static adversary A , i.e., an adversary
that corrupts t devices before the protocol starts. The protocol is semantically
secure against A, if A chooses two values x0Q, x1Q ∈ G2 and cannot determine
which of these two was shared with negligible advantage over random guessing,
given the output of a run of the protocol that shared either the secret x0Q or
x1Q. We prove the semantic security by showing that no such adversary exists.
If there exists an A that has a non-negligible advantage in attacking the
semantic security of our protocol, we can build a simulator SIM that uses A to
solve an instance of the divisional DDH problem in G2 (see Sect. 3.4). Since, this
is assumed to be a hard problem we conclude that no such adversary can exist.
We now describe this simulator. A tuple 〈Q, aQ, cQ, abQ〉 is given to SIM
who has to decide if this is a valid DH tuple, i.e., if cQ = bQ.
1. The simulator SIM does the pre-setup. He chooses the system parameters
PubPar, which contain P and P ′ = ηP , with η known to SIM. He constructs
a set of devices Di, of which one will be the designated device, denoted as
Dd. For each Di 6= Dd, SIM generates a random key pair. The public key of
Dd is set to Sd = cQ.
2. The adversary A receives PubPar and the set of devices along with their
public keys. He announces the subset of corrupted devices, which will be
denoted by Dj for j = 1 . . . t .
3. The simulator SIM gives the private keys sj of the corrupted devices to A.
Device Dd is corrupted with a worst-case probability of roughly 1/2, in which
case the simulation fails.
4. A outputs two values x0Q and x1Q, of which one has to be shared.
5. Without loss of generality, we assume SIM chooses x0Q. The output of the
VSS protocol is generated as follows.
– SIM chooses k random zk ∈R Z
∗
` and broadcasts commitments Ak = zkP .
– SIM constructs a random polynomial F (z) of degree t subject to F (0) =
x0Q and F (d) = aQ . For (1) to hold, future shares xiQ and x
′
iQ will
have to satisfy
αiQ = xiQ+ ηx
′
iQ with αi =
t∑
k=0
zki
k . (2)
SIM evaluates the polynomial F (z) and sets the shares xjQ = F (j) for
each corrupted Dj . For the non-corrupted Di 6= Dd, SIM chooses random
shares xiQ ∈R G2 . For i 6= j, the shares on the second polynomial x
′
iQ
and x′jQ are determined by (2).
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– With the private keys si and sj , SIM computes the protected shares
xiSi, x
′
iSi and xjSj , x
′
jSj .
– For Dd, SIM sets xdSd = abQ and x
′
dSd = η
−1(αdSd − abQ).
– All protected shares are broadcast by SIM.
6. The adversary outputs a guess to which of the secrets was shared. If A has
a non-negligible advantage in determining which secret was shared then SIM
concludes that 〈Q, aQ, cQ, abQ〉 must be a valid DH tuple.
The view of A consists of the commitments Ak, all public keys, the private
keys of the corrupted devices, all protected shares and the shares of the corrupted
devices. The adversary A can only gain an advantage in guessing which key
was shared from values, other than his own shares, which were not chosen at
random. This leaves him with only his shares xjQ and the values xdSd and Sd.
The adversary’s problem of deciding which secret was shared is equivalent to
deciding whether xdQ = x0Q−
∑
λjxjQ or xdQ = x1Q−
∑
λjxjQ. Because we
assume SIM chose x0Q, A has to decide whether 〈Q, x0Q−
∑
λjxjQ,Sd, xdSd〉
is a valid DH tuple or not. uunionsq
We note that given the specific form in which the shares are broadcast, our
PVSS protocol cannot be proved secure against an adaptive adversary by means
of a simulation argument, which does not imply that it is insecure. Indeed, it was
already suggested in [6] and [10] that to maintain private transmission of shares
some form of non-committing encryption should be used. We insist on storing
shares as xiSi in order to maintain the nice properties of this form, which allow
integrating our construction in other threshold applications, as shown in Sect. 5.
A somewhat related PVSS scheme was presented by Heidarvand and Vil-
lar [18].4 Our PVSS scheme differs from theirs by putting the secret in G2,
instead of GT , and thus allowing it to be a building block for DKG and discrete-
log constructions. Moreover, our protocol is semantically secure while the scheme
in [18] is only proved to be secure under a weaker security definition, because
the adversary is not allowed to choose the secrets that he has to distinguish.
4.3 Distributed Key Generation.
We now establish a new DKG protocol that outputs protected shares and is
publicly verifiable. Inspired by [15] and [6] the protocol consists of two phases.
In the first phase, the group’s private key is generated in a distributive manner
and shared through a joint PVSS. In the second phase, the group’s public key
is computed. This phase follows to a large extent the result of Canetti et al. [6].
The protocols proceeds as follows.
Each participating device runs an instance of our new PVSS protocol. It
chooses a secret ci,0 ∈R Z` and broadcasts shares of that secret in protected
form. These will be denoted as protected subshares. Each device, acting as a
dealer, that is not disqualified is added to a set of qualified devices, denoted as
4 Note that we use an asymmetric pairing which is more standard (e.g., see [13]) than
the symmetric form used in [18].
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QUAL. The group’s private key, although never computed explicitly, is defined
as xQ =
∑
i∈QUAL ci,0Q . A device’s protected share xiSi is computed as the
sum of the protected subshares that were received from the devices in QUAL.
To recover the group’s public key y = gx, the qualified devices will expose
gxi from which y can easily be computed through Lagrange interpolation.5 Each
device will prove in zero-knowledge that the exponent of gxi matches the share
xiQ hidden in xiSi, without revealing it. These interactive zero-knowledge proofs
require uniformly distributed challenges, which can be the same for all devices.
A uniformly distributed challenge is generated through another run of our
joint PVSS. All devices receive protected shares diSi. After open reconstruction
we have a uniformly distributed element dQ ∈ G2 . However, the challenge needs
to be some element d˜ ∈ Z`. This implies a bijective (not necessarily homomor-
phic) mapping ψ : G2 → Z` . An example of such a mapping is to take the
x-coordinate of dQ modulo `, as is used in ECDSA signatures. Several issues
have been reported with this mapping and alternatives, e.g., taking the sum of
the x and the y-coordinates modulo ` [20], have been proposed. We refer the
reader to [4] for a more in-depth treatment of this subject.
The details of the protocols are given in Fig. 2. Note that on the one hand,
at least t + 1 honest devices are required for the protocol to end successfully,
hence we require n > 2t. On the other hand, since we require no explicit private
channels, only a minimum of t+1 honest devices must participate in the DKG.
We now prove that our new DKG protocol is a secure DKG protocol according
to the requirements specified in Definition 2.
Theorem 2. Our new DKG protocol is a secure DKG protocol (Definition 2)
under the divisional variant of the coDBDH-2 assumption.
Proof (Correctness). All honest devices construct the same set of qualified de-
vices QUAL since this is determined by public broadcast information.
– (C1) Each Di that is in QUAL at the end of phase 1 has successfully shared
ci,0Q through a run of our PVSS protocol. Any set of t+1 honest devices Di
that combine correct shares xjQ can reconstruct the same secret xQ since
xQ =
∑
i∈QUAL
ci,0Q =
∑
i∈QUAL

∑
j
λjxijQ


=
∑
j
λj
∑
i∈QUAL
xijQ =
∑
j
λjxjQ .
In the key extraction phase of our protocol at least t + 1 values gxi have
been exposed and thus using interpolation gxj can be computed for any Dj .
This allows to tell apart correct shares from incorrect ones.
5 As opposed to [6], we do not expose gci,0 , which avoids the costly reconstruction of
the gcj,0 of the qualified devices that no longer participate in the second phase.
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1. All participating devicesDi run the PVSS protocol simultaneously, the protected
subshares are only broadcast after receiving all commitments from all Di .
(a) Each Di constructs two polynomials fi(z) and f
′
i(z) of degree t by choosing
random coefficients ci,k, c
′
i,k ∈R Z
∗
` for k = 0 . . . t:
fi(z) = ci,0 + ci,1z + . . .+ ci,tz
t
, f
′
i(z) = c
′
i,0 + c
′
i,1z + . . .+ c
′
i,tz
t
,
and broadcasts commitments
Ai,k = ci,kP + c
′
i,kP
′
, k = 0 . . . t .
(b) For each device Dj , each Di computes and broadcasts
xijSj , x
′
ijSj with xij = fi(j) , x
′
ij = f
′
i(j) .
(c) Each device verifies the broadcast shares for all Di by checking that
eˆ(P, xijSj) · eˆ(P
′
, x
′
ijSj) =
t∏
k=0
eˆ(Ai,k, Sj)
jk
.
Each Di that is not disqualified as a dealer is added to the list of quali-
fied devices, denoted by QUAL. The group’s private key is defined as xQ =∑
i∈QUAL ci,0Q . For each Di its protected share is computed as
Ci = xiSi =
∑
j∈QUAL
xjiSi .
2. The qualified devices expose gxi to compute the public key y = gx.
(a) Each Di in QUAL broadcasts g
xi and siP
′′. It is easily verified that
eˆ(siP
′′, Q) = eˆ(P ′′, Si) . In addition, Di chooses a random ri ∈R Z
∗
` and
broadcasts commitments gri and riSi.
(b) Generation of the uniform challenge, needed in the zero-knowledge proof.
– Devices in QUAL run a Joint PVSS and obtain protected shares diSi
and d′iSi, which are broadcast and verified. We denote the commitments
of this Joint PVSS as Bi,k .
– Open reconstruction of dQ. Devices in QUAL broadcast diQ and d
′
iQ.
These are verified by checking that
eˆ(P, diQ) · eˆ(P
′
, d
′
iQ) =
t∏
k=0
eˆ(Bk, Q)
jk for Bk =
∑
i∈QUAL
Bi,k .
– Let d˜ = ψ(dQ), where ψ is a bijective map from G2 to Z`.
(c) Each Di broadcasts Zi = s
−1
i (riSi + d˜Ci) = (ri + d˜xi)Q. Any device can
verify that
eˆ(P,Zi) = g
ri(gxi)d˜ and eˆ(siP
′′
, Zi) = eˆ(P
′′
, riSi) · eˆ(P
′′
, Ci)
d˜
.
(d) Public key y is computed from t+ 1 correctly verified gxi as y =
∏
gxiλi .
Fig. 2. Publicly verifiable DKG with protected shares.
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– (C2) This follows immediately from the key extraction phase and the relation
between the ci,0Q and the shares xiQ given for the previous property (C1).
– (C3) The private key is defined as xQ =
∑
i∈QUAL ci,0Q and each ci,0Q
was shared through an instance of our PVSS. Since we proved that a static
adversary cannot learn any information about the shared secret, the private
key is uniformly distributed as long as one non-corrupted device successfully
contributed to the sum that defines xQ. uunionsq
Uniformity. Our protocol withstands the attack of a rushing adversary that can
influence the distribution of the group’s key as described by Gennaro et al. [17].
In this attack an adversary is able to compute a deterministic function of the
private key from the broadcasts, before sending out his contributions. He can
influence the set of qualified devices by choosing whether or not to send out
proper contributions. This allows influencing the outcome of the deterministic
function and thus the distribution of the private key. In our protocol, no such
function can be computed before the second phase. But, because the private key
and thus also the correction factors are fixed after the first phase and determined
by QUAL, the adversary can no longer influence the group’s key. As long as t+1
honest devices participate, the public key can be recovered in the second phase.
Proof (Secrecy). We describe a simulator SIM that, given a public key y, sim-
ulates a run of the protocol and produces an output that is indistinguishable
from the adversary’s view of a real run of the protocol that ended with the given
public key. We assume that SIM knows η ∈ Z∗` for which P
′ = ηP .
– The first phase of the DKG is run as in the real protocol. Since SIM knows the
private keys si of at least t+1 non-corrupted devices, he knows at least t+1
shares xiQ = s
−1
i Ci. By interpolation of these shares, SIM learns the shares
of the corrupted devices. This allows SIM to compute gxi for all devices.
– In the second phase of the DKG protocol SIM sets gx
∗
i for the non-corrupted
Di, such that the public key will be y. The g
x∗i for the non-corrupted Di
are calculated by interpolation of the gxj of the corrupted Dj and y = g
x.
For the zero knowledge proof to hold, SIM chooses a random d∗ ∈R Z
∗
` and
forces the outcome of the open reconstruction of the challenge to d∗Q. For
each non-corrupted Di, SIM computes the commitments β
∗
i = g
zi(gx
∗
i )−d˜
and B∗i = ziSi − d˜xiSi, for random zi ∈R Z
∗
` and d˜ = ψ(d
∗Q).
(a) SIM broadcasts 〈gx
∗
i , siP
′′, β∗i , B
∗
i 〉 for each non-corrupted Di.
(b) All devices run the Joint PVSS and hold shares diQ and d
′
iQ. SIM forces
the outcome of the open reconstruction of the challenge to d∗Q.
• SIM computes the djQ from the corrupted devices by interpolation
of t+ 1 shares diQ of the non-corrupted devices.
• SIM sets the d∗iQ for the non-corrupted devices by interpolation of
the djQ of the corrupted devices and d
∗Q.
• By knowing η, SIM will compute d′∗i Q such that diQ+ηd
′
iQ = d
∗
iQ+
ηd′∗i Q . As such, the broadcast shares d
∗
iQ, d
′∗
i Q, will verify against
the commitments.
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(c) All Z∗i = ziQ are broadcast and correctly verified.
(d) At the end of the protocol the public key is computed as the given y.
To prevent an adversary from being able to distinguish between a real run
of the protocol and a simulation, the output distribution must be identical. The
first phase, i.e., the Joint PVSS, is identical in both cases. The data that are
output in the second phase and that have a potentially different distribution in
a real run and simulation are given in the following table. We show that all data
in this table have a uniform distribution.
REAL SIM
1. gxi gx
∗
i
2. gri , riSi β
∗
i , B
∗
i
3. diQ, d
′
iQ d
∗
iQ, d
′∗
i Q
4. Zi Z
∗
i
1. The values xi are evaluations of a polynomial of degree t with uniformly
random coefficients. The values x∗i are evaluations of a polynomial that goes
through t evaluations of the first polynomial, namely the xj of the corrupted
participants, and through the discrete logarithm of y. Since the protocol is
assumed to generate a uniformly random key, the new polynomial’s distri-
bution is indistinguishable from the distribution of the first.
2. The value ri was chosen uniformly at random. In the simulation β
∗
i =
gzi(gx
∗
i )−d˜ and B∗i = ziSi − d˜xiSi. The value zi is uniformly random and
d˜ = ψ(d∗Q) is derived from the uniformly random d∗.
3. Since the following relation holds, diQ + ηd
′
iQ = d
∗
iQ + ηd
′∗
i Q, it suffices
to show that both diQ and d
∗
iQ have identical distributions. Because d was
chosen uniformly at random, the same reasoning as for the gxi holds.
4. We have that Zi = riQ+ ηxiQ and Z
∗
i = ziQ. The values ri, d and zi were
chosen uniformly at random.
We notice that even though the modified gx
∗
i have the right output distri-
bution, it is important to note that by broadcasting the modified gx
∗
i we intro-
duce a new assumption. Namely that an adversary cannot distinguish between
〈P,Q, xisiQ, siQ, g
xi〉 and 〈P,Q, xisiQ, siQ, g
x∗i 〉. This is the divisional variant
of the coDBDH-2 assumption, as defined in Sect. 3.4. An adversary cannot dis-
tinguish 〈Q,Si, diQ, diSi〉 from 〈Q,Si, d
∗
iQ, diSi〉. This is the divisional variant
of the DDH assumption, which is a weaker assumption than the coDBDH-2 as-
sumption, meaning that if one could not solve the coDBDH-2 problem, one can
also not solve the DDH problem. Knowledge of P allows to calculate gdi and gd
∗
i
and to transform this to the divisional variant of the coDBDH-2 assumption. uunionsq
5 Threshold Applications
In this section our construction is used to turn discrete-log schemes into threshold
variants with protected shares. It is not our intention to give a rigorous proof of
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security of these variants. We rather want to demonstrate the ease with which
our construction fits into existing schemes. We do this for the ElGamal [14]
and the Cramer-Shoup [7] cryptosystems, where we show how pairings allow
implicit use of the shares, i.e., without having to reveal them explicitly, and the
Schnorr [25] signature scheme.
5.1 ElGamal
Basic Scheme. We define the ElGamal [14] scheme in GT with some minor
modifications; the randomness is moved from GT to G1 and the private key is an
element of G2 instead of Z
∗
` , i.e., xQ ∈ G2 for some x ∈R Z
∗
` . Let y = eˆ(P,Q)
x be
the corresponding public key. Encryption and decryption are defined as follows.
– Encrypt(PubPar,y,m): To encrypt a messagem ∈ GT under the public key
y, choose a random k ∈R Z
∗
` and output the ciphertext
(R, e) = (kP,myk) ∈ G1 ×GT .
– Decrypt(PubPar,xQ,(R, e)): To decrypt the given ciphertext (R, e) output
the plaintext
m =
e
eˆ(R, xQ)
∈ GT .
Threshold Variant. Encryption in the threshold variant is the same as in the
basic scheme. To decrypt a given ciphertext we have to combine the randomness
kP with t + 1 shares xiQ, which are stored as xiSi. If the shares were stored
as gxisi , it would have been impossible to combine them with the randomiser
or the ElGamal encryption and for each device Di the ciphertext would contain
something like gxisik. By taking advantage of the bilinearity of the pairing,
the size of the ciphertext remains constant. Note that Di never has to reveal
his share explicitly; his private key is combined with the randomness and then
paired with the correction factor. The cost of providing a partial decryption is
minimal, namely one elliptic-curve point multiplication. In this way we can use
small devices as partial decryption oracles. Decryption goes as follows.
– T-Decrypt(PubPar,{Di , Si},(R, e)): To decrypt the ciphertext (R, e) each
device Di provides a partial decryption
Di = s
−1
i R = s
−1
i kP ∈ G1 .
The combining device receives the Di and verifies that eˆ(Di, Si) = eˆ(R,Q).
He then combines t+ 1 contributions to output the plaintext
m =
e
d
with d =
∏
eˆ(Di, Ci)
λi .
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5.2 Cramer-Shoup
Basic Scheme. Cramer and Shoup [7] presented an ElGamal based cryptosys-
tem in the standard model that provides ciphertext indistinguishability under
adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA2). We define their scheme in GT
with the same modifications as in the ElGamal scheme; the first two (random)
elements in the ciphertext are moved from GT to G1 and the private key is a
tuple from G5
2
instead of (Z∗` )
5. Let H : G1 ×G1 ×GT → Z` be an element of a
family of universal one-way hash functions. The private key is
privK = (x1Q, x2Q, y1Q, y2Q, zQ) ∈R G
5
2
and the public key is
pubK = (c, d, h) = (gx1
1
gx2
2
, g
y1
1
g
y2
2
, gz
1
) ∈ G3T .
Encryption and decryption are defined as follows.
– Encrypt(PubPar,pubK,m): To encrypt a message m ∈ GT under pubK,
choose a random k ∈R Z` and output the ciphertext
(U1, U2, e, v) = (kP, kP
′,mhk, ckdkα) ∈ G21×G
2
T with α = H(U1, U2, e) .
– Decrypt(PubPar,privK,(U1, U2, e, v)): To decrypt ciphertext (U1, U2, e, v),
first compute α = H(U1, U2, e) and validate the ciphertext by testing if
eˆ(U1, x1Q+ y1αQ) · eˆ(U2, x2Q+ y2αQ) = v .
If the test fails, the ciphertext is rejected, otherwise output the plaintext
m =
e
eˆ(U1, zQ)
∈ GT .
Threshold Variant. It is clear that the Cramer-Shoup public key is not im-
mediately established from running five instances of our DKG protocol. The
decomposition of c = gx1
1
gx2
2
and d = gy1
1
g
y2
2
should not be known. We can solve
this problem by introducing a third polynomial f ′′(z). Each device receives three
instead of two shares. The public key is extracted by revealing the third share
and by proving the discrete log equality of g
x′′i
3
and x′′i Si. The DKG is thereby
reduced to two runs of the variant and one run of the basic DKG protocol. This
results in five protected shares Cx1i , C
x2
i , C
y1
i , C
y2
i and C
z
i for each device.
Encryption is the same as in the basic scheme. The decryption routine, which
applies the same ideas as in the threshold ElGamal scheme goes as follows. Note
that the cost of providing a partial decryption is minimal, namely two elliptic-
curve point multiplications.
– T-Decrypt(PubPar,{Di, Si},(U1, U2, e, v)): To decrypt the given ciphertext
(U1, U2, e, v) each device Di provides Di = s
−1
i U1 and D
′
i = s
−1
i U2. The
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combining device verifies that eˆ(Di, Si) = eˆ(U1, Q) and eˆ(D
′
i, Si) = eˆ(U2, Q).
He then computes
vi = eˆ(Di, C
x1
i + αC
y1
i ) · eˆ(D
′
i, C
x2
i + αC
y2
i ) .
and combines t + 1 values vi to validate the ciphertext by testing that v =∏
vλii . If validation fails, the ciphertext is rejected. The combining device
combines t+ 1 contributions to output the plaintext
m =
e
d
with d =
∏
eˆ(Di, C
z
i )
λi .
5.3 Schnorr Signatures
The Schnorr signature scheme [25] is an example of a scheme that provides ex-
istential unforgeability under an adaptive chosen-message attack in the random
oracle model [24] and has been used many times to create a threshold signa-
ture scheme, e.g., in [17,1]. We will define the signature scheme in GT and then
extend it to a threshold variant.
Basic Scheme. Let H ′ : {0, 1}∗ ×GT → Z` be a cryptographic hash function.
Let the private key be xQ ∈ G2 for x ∈R Z
∗
` and y = g
x ∈ GT the public key.
– Sign(PubPar,xQ,m): To sign a message m ∈ {0, 1}∗ with the private key
xQ choose a random k ∈R Z`, compute r = eˆ(P, kQ) and c = H
′(m, r), and
output the signature
(c, σ) = (H ′(m, r), kQ + c xQ) ∈ Z` ×G2 .
– Verify(PubPar,y,(c, σ),m): To verify the signature (c, σ) on a message m
compute r˜ = eˆ(P, σ)y−c and verify equality of c = H ′(m, r˜) .
Threshold Variant. The basic scheme naturally extends to a threshold variant.
As opposed to the encryption schemes, the bilinearity of the pairing is not really
needed. However, the signing devices need to share some randomness and will,
therefore, run the DKG protocol of Sect. 4.3. Signature verification is the same
as in the basic scheme. Signing goes as follows.
– T-Sign(PubPar,{Di},m): To sign a message m ∈ {0, 1}
∗ with the group’s
private key the devices Di will run an instance of the DKG protocol of
Sect. 4.3. Each device then holds a share kiSi in protected form of kQ ∈ G2.
Because the value r = eˆ(P, kQ) ∈ GT is publicly computed at the end of
the protocol, each device can compute c = H ′(m, r) and σi = s
−1
i (kiSi +
cCi) = (ki + c xi)Q, which is sent to the combining device. Note that these
partial signatures can be verified since the output of the DKG protocols
contained gki and gxi . Values that were not in the output can be computed
through interpolation. The combining device computes the signing equation
σ =
∑
σiλi and outputs the signature
(c, σ) = (H ′(m, r), kQ + c xQ) ∈ Z` ×G2 .
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6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have shown how to increase resilience in threshold cryptog-
raphy by including small devices with limited or no secure storage capabilities.
Assuming these devices have some support for public-key functionality, shares
can be stored in protected form. By using bilinear pairings, this particular form
yields some advantages. The most important feature is public verifiability, which
makes explicit private channels and cumbersome complaint procedures obsolete.
Moreover, not all devices need to be present during group setup, which is per-
formed by the DKG protocol. We have demonstrated how to adopt the protected
shares in existing discrete-log based cryptosystems and signature schemes. Be-
cause shares are never needed in unprotected form, small devices can be used as
decryption oracles at a minimal cost.
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